




Distance protection in 150/60 kV transformer 60 kV feeders
two real blackout case studies
Bak, Claus Leth; Lind Hansen, Magnus; Nissen, Jens Ole
Published in:
The Journal of Engineering







Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Bak, C. L., Lind Hansen, M., & Nissen, J. O. (2018). Distance protection in 150/60 kV transformer 60 kV feeders:
two real blackout case studies. The Journal of Engineering, 2018(15), 802-806.
https://doi.org/10.1049/joe.2018.0144
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: December 27, 2020
The Journal of Engineering
The 14th International Conference on Developments in Power System
Protection (DPSP 2018)
Distance protection in 150/60 kV transformer
60 kV feeders: two real blackout case studies
eISSN 2051-3305
Received on 2nd May 2018
Accepted on 12th June 2018
E-First on 20th August 2018
doi: 10.1049/joe.2018.0144
www.ietdl.org
Claus Leth Bak1 , Magnus Lind Hansen2, Jens Ole Nissen2
1Department of Energy Technology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
2Nordenergi Net, Hjørring, Denmark
 E-mail: clb@iet.aau.dk
Abstract: Correct setting of protection relays are of major importance to the reliable operation of the power system. The root
cause of two consecutive blackouts is analysed and shown to origin from a combination of several minor errors which all can be
related to an insufficient/wrong setting of the distance relays and their optional functions together with insufficient testing when
putting into operation. The learning lessons are discussed and outlined in order to avoid future blackouts having similar origin.
1 Introduction
Distance relays are widely used in transmission and distribution as
both primary and back-up protection. One of the less common
applications is its use as a dedicated busbar protection for busbars
fed by a transformer. The distance relay is installed in the low
voltage (LV) side transformer feeder which feeds the busbar(s) and
acts as a primary protection against violent busbar and switchgear
short circuits. At the same time this distance relay acts as a back-up
protection for the distance relays installed in the line feeders
connected to the busbar(s) and thirdly as an overload protection of
the transformer. So this transformer distance relay must on one
hand be set so it covers close-up busbar faults having fault
impedance being virtually only the arc resistance and at the same
time be selective with the outgoing line feeders distance protection.
Furthermore, it is common to have paralleled transformers to feed
the busbar(s), each having their own distance relay in the LV
feeder. This paralleling complicates the situation both with regards
to zone reach and fault (arc) resistance.
This paper presents a post-study of two consecutive blackout
events in Northern Jutland, Denmark during the Christmas holidays
of 2015 caused by improper setting of transformer distance
protection relays. The authors conducted a thorough analysis of
both events and this paper shows that blackout events, as usually,
contains more than just one singular mistake, but numerous,
smaller mistakes, which are individually not so significant (i.e.
protection might work properly for a long period having no
malfunctions), but when a very specific network/load condition
appears the card house goes over and a blackout happens. The
study is very instructive due to its step-by-step deduction which
shows that the two blackout events did not have the same root
cause, but the second event was triggered by an attempt to avoid a
similar blackout as the first one just leading to another blackout
with a different root cause.
Another discussion presented in this paper is that modern
numerical distance protection relays contains a huge number of
parameters to be set. A wrong setting of just one single parameter
can lead to malfunction of the entire protection causing a blackout.
Therefore during commissioning a very rigorous secondary testing
is necessary. It is not sufficient just to check the zones. The entire
functionality of the relay including various blocking functions and
functional limits (i.e. current thresholds) and possible built-in back-
up facilities (i.e. overcurrent and switch-on-to-fault) must be fully
checked. Finally, this paper presents recommendations for
transformer distance protection relays in order to avoid the above
listed inexpediencies.
2 Blackout of Bredkaer (BDK) at 28 December
2015
150/60 kV substation Bredkaer BDK links the transmission system
(150 kV) and the distribution system (60 kV) close to major city
Hjørring in Northern Jutland. Two 100 MVA 150/60 kV
transformers are normally in parallel operation but single
transformer operation can happen during maintenance, low load
and similar situations. The single line diagram for this layout is
shown in Fig. 1. 
The 60 kV station and busbars are outdoor equipment and are
protected against short-circuit arcs by distance relays A and B. The
relays are set to cover basically an impedance in zone 1 which is Z 
= Rarc + j0 Ω with a time delay typically around 0.5 s in order to be
selective with the feeders connected to the 60 kV busbar. The arc
resistance depends from short-circuit current, distance (which is
given by physical distance between busbars) (1) and the time it has





Rarc∗ = 1 +
5 ⋅ ν ⋅ tB
Iarc
⋅ Rarc (2)
larc is the length of the arc in [m], Iarc is the short-circuit current [A
RMS], v is the wind speed and tB the time the arc is alive and
developing. The latter is important when using switch off with
some delay which is the case for the distance relay busbar
protection. This means that the arc resistance will depend on
whether one or two transformers are in operation as the 60 kV side
short circuit current is higher for two transformers than for one.
This will lower the arc resistance when two transformers are in
operation. On the other hand; when both transformers are in
operation one relay (A or B) will only measure half of the fault
current which will cause an underreach of 50% in both relay A and
B. This will to some extent be compensated by the lower arc
resistance when two transformers are in operation. So the usual
setting philosophy is to set the zone 1 R-reach as if only one
transformer is in operation knowing that this will lead to some
underreach having two transformers in operation. The X- reach is
set to give selective backup with the 60 kV feeders. With modern
relays having more than one setting group a setting group is
associated with single transformer operation and another with two
transformer operation.
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2.1 Relay settings in BDK
The transformer feeders KT31 and KT32 were refurbished in the
summer 2015 and modern numerical distance relays Siemens
7SA631 [2] were installed to replace old electromechanical
distance relays. The new relays are employing two setting groups,
where setting group A is used for single transformer operation and
setting group B for two transformer operation. Only settings
relevant for the relay blackout malfunction are listed.
Group A: Zone 5 non-directional 40 Ω R/X = 1 (R = 40 Ω and X = 
40 Ω) and with load encroachment Rload = 35 Ω and maximum load
angle 45°, T5 delay 4.5 s
Group B: Zone 5 non-directional 80 Ω R/X = 1 (R = 80 Ω and X = 
80 Ω) and with load encroachment Rload = 70 Ω and maximum load
angle 45°, T5 delay 4.5 s
Circuit breaker auxiliary contacts are used to switch between
setting group A and setting group B.
The settings and the putting in operation of the relays have been
done by an external consultant company.
2.2 Relay operation during blackout
Blackout is caused by the consecutive switch off of both
transformers KT31 and KT32.
KT31: The trip is caused by a three-phase event after 4.5 s, see
Fig. 2. This corresponds to zone 5 trip. The current recorded is
around 310–320 A in the three phases, Fig. 2.
KT32: The trip is caused by a three-phase event after 4.5 s. This
corresponds to zone 5 trip. The current recorded is around 530 A,
Fig. 3
2.3 Analysis of the cause of the blackout
Obviously KT31 was switched off non-intendedly by zone 5 where
after KT32 also was switched off non-intentionally, again by zone
5. This is a very bad scenario as one of the reasons for operating
two transformers in parallel is the expected improved reliability,
i.e. does one transformer fail the other is still in operation.
Cause of KT31 trip: This is the first trip when both KT31 and
KT32 are in operation.
Using SIGRA fault record current in L3 at instant of trip was
IL3trip = 321.6 A ∠ 1° and phase voltage in L3 UL3trip = 35.54 kV ∠
46°, see Fig. 4. These are not at all faulty condition values, i.e.
current is around one-third of the rated current for the transformer
and the voltage is a normal phase voltage. Therefore the first
indication is that this is not a faulty condition, but a wrong relay
zone setting which has led to the relay tripping for normal load
impedance. 





Which corresponds to Zfault, sec = 184.2∠45° Ω in secondary values.
From Fig. 2, it is concluded that the relay detects FORWARD
direction. This caused some confusion as the SCADA system at
that time showed the power flow to be from 60 kV towards 150 kV.
Further analysis showed that the relay was set wrong regarding
current transformer polarity due to confusion between being
installed in a feeder (where FORWARD is towards line) as being
installed in a transformer feeder (where FORWARD is towards
busbar). Therefore the measured fault loop impedance (only
showed for phase L3) was measured in the FORWARD direction.
Plotting of the measured impedance in the zone setting graph
from DIGSI revealed the cause of the trip, see Fig. 5 
As can be seen the intended normal three-phase load (in this
case power flow to transmission level due to wind power
production in the area) has entered non-directional zone 5 and led
to trip. This is caused by a wrong assumption when operating
transformers in parallel using the doubled reach (see Section 2.2) to
compensate for the underreach caused by the parallel operation.
This assumption is actually wrong in two ways as the doubling of
the reach should be exactly the opposite, i.e. in half to
accommodate the trip of one transformer to be taken over by the
second for a shorter period, i.e. the doubling of the load and
thereby the half of the load impedance.
Cause of KT32 trip: This is the second trip immediately after
the KT31 trip separating BDK 60 kV busbar from transmission
thereby causing full blackout of the Northern part of Vendsyssel,
Jutland.
KT32 has now taken over the (normal) load current from KT31
which gives rise to a current IL3trip = 563.4∠0° A and voltage
UL3trip = 36.3∠40° kV, again normal values giving rise to a
measured impedance
Fig. 1  Single line diagram of two-transformer supply of BDK 60 kV
busbar. A and B are distance relays
 
Fig. 2  Relay KT31 trip log
 
Fig. 3  Relay KT32 trip log
 
Fig. 4  KT31 currents (left) and voltages (right) at the instant of trip
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Which corresponds to Zfault, sec = 107.4∠40° Ω. Checking the event
log of KT32 shows that the change of setting group B (parallel
operation) to setting group A (single transformer) happened at
20:20:31:752, see Fig. 6 
The trip of KT32 was executed at 20:20:26:969 + 4:624 = 
20:20:31:593, see Fig. 7. 
Subtracting the instant of setting group change over from
instant of trip f KT32 reveals that the change of setting group from
B to A was only 159 ms delayed as compared to the trip. In other
words, KT32 relay changed setting group slower than the zone 5
trip caused by the above-mentioned normal load situation. Section
2.1 states that setting group A has zone 5 setting 40 Ω (primary
value) which can be compared with the above 64.5 Ω so a faster
setting group change to group A would have solved the problem
and avoided the blackout.
2.4 Discussion
It can be concluded that the relays operate precisely as being
(erroneously) set. However, there are few further complications
which lead to the blackout:
• The initial wrong assumption of the doubling of the zone 5
impedances in parallel operation.
• The normal load situation is actually a production and it has a
rather low-power factor. Therefore it can enter zone 5 ‘ears’
outside the load encroachment.
• That the setting group change over operates too slowly when
subject to two consecutive faults with a very short intermediate
time.
Finally, it can be concluded that the cause of this blackout is
similar to many other major blackouts caused by a wrong/not
sufficient insight into the variations of normal power system loads
and the outermost distance relay zone coordination as, i.e. the 2003
North American blackout [1].
3 Blackout of DYB at 30 December 2015
150/60 kV substation Dybvad DYB has the same configuration as
BDK, i.e. like shown in Fig. 1 and has also recently (before this
blackout) been equipped with new Siemens 7SA611 distance
relays. These have been set and put into operation by the same
consultant company using the same principles.
Following the blackout in BDK 2 days earlier NordEnergi did
not yet know the detailed explanation to the BDK event so with
good reason they suspected the newly installed distance relays in
BDK to have some kind of wrong setting/malfunction/improper
installation. As DYB was equipped in the same way it was decided
to de-activate the distance protection module in the 7SA611 relays
and use the back-up overcurrent protection (also included in the
7SA611 relays) for protecting the 60 kV station until a complete
understanding of the event in BDK was ready.
The 7SA631 relays OC backup becomes active when the
voltage measurement of the relay disappears. This is typically due
to some external fault in voltage transformers and/or their cable
connections. The most common way to announce this state to the
relays is by using mini-circuit breakers (for protection the voltage
transformer secondary circuits) with an auxiliary contact which is
connected to a binary input at the relay. If the mini-CB trips the
relay will switch to OC backup as the distance function will
acknowledge the missing voltage as an impedance approaching 0 
Ω and issue instantaneous trip although no primary fault exists.
However, in this particular installation normal fuses were used
to protect the secondary circuit so in order to achieve the same
‘reaction’ (disabling distance and enabling OC backup) personnel
from NordEnergi opened the switchable terminals of the voltage
transformers for KT31 and KT32 distance relays. The relay
internally recognises ‘lack of voltage’ instead of using the binary
signal from mini-CB.
DYB experienced two consecutive blackouts, one at 04:48 and
another at 09:38. In between both transformers were put into
operation without problems.
3.1 Relay operation during blackout
Blackout is caused by the consecutive switch off of both
transformers KT31 and KT32 at 04:48:21 and 09:38:37. Both have
same cause and progress.
KT31: The trip is caused by a three-phase event after 0.5 s, see
Fig. 8. This corresponds to zone 1 trip. The current recorded is
around 100 A in the three phases.
KT32: The trip is caused by a three-phase event instantaneously (1 
ms) caused by distance pickup of fault loop BC, see Fig. 9. The
current recorded is around 180 A.
Fig. 5  R–X graph shows the measured impedance in secondary values to
just enter zone 5 in reverse direction. NE means NordEnergi (distribution
60 kV) and ENdk is TSO (150 kV). The arrows indicate power direction
 
Fig. 6  Event log from KT32 shows change of setting group
 
Fig. 7  Trip log of KT32 shows the time of trip
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3.2 Analysis of the cause of the blackout
Obviously, KT31 was switched off non-intendedly by zone 1 where
after KT32 also was switched off non-intentionally, but
instantaneously by the distance function.
Cause of KT31 trip: This is the first trip when both KT31 and
KT32 are in operation.
The first to conclude is that the distance function was active
although it was intended to be disabled by disconnecting the
voltage transformers (i.e. fuse failure initiated backup overcurrent
(OC) should be active). Checking the event log shows multiple
OFF/ON events for distance BLOCKED, backup OC BLOCKED,
emergency MODE and voltage ABSENT around the time of the
blackout, see Fig. 10. 
The manual for 7SA611 states that ‘In address 2913 FFM U < 
max (3ph) the minimum voltage threshold is set. If the measured
voltage drops below this threshold and a simultaneous current jump
which exceeds the limits according to address 2914 FFM Idelta
(3p) is not detected while all three phase currents are greater than
the minimum current required for the impedance measurement by
the distance protection according to address 1202 Minimum Iph>,
a three-phase measured voltage failure is recognized’.
So the transition to backup OC depends from the absence of VT
voltage. Address 2913 was set rather low and it is likely that
induced noise in the disconnected and non-grounded VT signal
cables have led to a voltage at relay voltage terminals not always
being below this set value. Furthermore address 1202 (for distance
function enabled) was set to 100 A. At the time of the trip the load
current was precisely exceeding this value, see Fig. 11. 
So by sheer coincidence measured VT voltage fluctuated (due
to noise) to a value higher than threshold (2913) disabling backup
OC and load current exceeded 100 A (1202) enabling distance
leading to a measured impedance virtually zero due to the missing
voltage. This caused zone 1 trip with the correct time delay 0.5 s
Cause of KT32 trip: This is the second trip immediately after
the KT31 trip separating Dybvad (DYB) 60 kV busbar from
transmission thereby causing full blackout of the Eastern part of
Vendsyssel, Jutland.
The root cause of this trip is the same as for KT31, i.e. the
wrongly recognition of fuse failure combined with the load current
exceeding 100 A. Careful checking of the settings revealed a
typing error in address 1356 for the extended zone 1B. Time delay
T1B should have been set to infinity ∝ (oo) disabling this zone but
was set to 0.00. The small types on the laptop screen have probably
made this error likely to happen, see Fig. 12. 
This led to an immediate trip by zone 1B with time delay 0 s.
3.3 Discussion
The reason that KT31 trips as the first is due to many factors. Load
current for KT31 is just exceeding 100 A, whereas it is 84 A for
KT32. This is due to the fact that the two transformers have
different MVA rating thereby not sharing the load current evenly.
Z1B is set correctly disabled (∝ s) in KT31. Trip of KT31 leads to
a rise in load current for KT32 (from 84 to 180 A, see Fig. 13)
thereby activating distance leading to an immediate trip in Z1B.
The order of trip would have changed if the wrong setting of T1B
was shifted to the other transformer. 
The reason for the blackout not happening immediately when
disconnecting the VTs is due to one or more of the criteria for fuse
failure not being violated. Load current is one and it is common
that this can be below 100 A due to infeed of decentralised
production to the 60 kV network.
So it can be concluded that the initial blackout in BDK caused a
lack of confidence to the relays in DYB which were intended
disconnected, but this was done in a way not appropriate.
Furthermore setting errors led to a root cause for the blackouts in
DYB which were different than in BDK. In this way, all three
blackouts are actually linked together as a common occurrence.
4 Discussion and recommendations
The blackouts discussed in Sections 2 and 3 show a number of
important learning lessons in order to avoid future blackouts which
are briefly summarised below:
Fig. 8  Trip log of KT31 for fault at 04:48
 
Fig. 9  Trip log of KT32 for fault at 04:48
 
Fig. 10  Part of event log for KT31 shows ON/OFF changes between
distance and emergency OC
 
Fig. 11  Load current around instant of trip for KT31
 
Fig. 12  Typing error for T1B. Should have been ∝ (top) but became 0.00
(bottom)
 
Fig. 13  Rise of load current for KT32 at instant of trip
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• The correct operation of modern numerical protection relays
relies on a careful and correct setting of numerous parameters.
Wrong setting of one single parameter can lead to a complete
malfunction leading to blackout.
• Personnel doing the calculation of settings, implementing these
and putting the relay into operation must be highly skilled
experts in order to avoid wrong settings leading to blackout.
• The initial testing and putting a newly installed numerical relay
into operation must be very rigorous and thorough. It is not
enough to just to test zone settings with secondary testing
equipment. Every single active function (extended zones,
backup, fuse failure, earth fault etc.) must be tested giving
evidence of correct function. Default relay settings are not
always sufficient to assure a correct mode of operation in all
cases.
• Special care should be given to the changeover of setting groups
as this includes around 5 s of internal time delay in the relay (as
discussed in Section 2). The normal need for a changeover is
usually due to intentional disconnection of a power system
component such as a line or a transformer. Disconnection is due
to a trip (as in our case) can lead to other relays tripping because
the changeover is slower than the protection function reacting on
the changed conditions caused by the first trip.
• Fuse failure measurement supervision must be carefully set and
tested to avoid wrong operation due to induced noise voltages. It
must not be too sensitive.
It is recommended to consider the following when using
distance relays as transformer feeder protection:
• Carefully assess the need for setting group change. Is this really
necessary or can an acceptable protection be achieved using just
one well selected set of parameters.
• The setting of the outermost zones must be carefully matched
with load impedance. It is not sufficient just to consider the load
in MW alone. The load angle must also be considered in order to
correctly shape the load encroachment. Transformers in parallel
feeding networks having other points of infeed can exhibit large
circulating reactive currents which can lead to impedances
entering the outermost zone.
• The use of fuse failure enabled backup protection must rely on
mini-CB with auxiliary contact rather than internally calculated
voltages in relay. Furthermore disabling of main protection by
disconnecting VTs should be avoided.
• Relays should be tested using primary tests to check correct
polarity of VTs and CTs.
It is worth noting that the modern numerical relays used did not
malfunction. They were merely used in a wrong/inadequate way.
5 Conclusions
Modern numerical protection relays are much more complicated to
use than traditional old-fashioned electromechanical relays. The
main advantage is that they are more reliable and can be more
precisely adapted to very specific protection needs and that they
include more than just one protection function. The main
disadvantage is that they require highly skilled engineers to plan
the settings, implement these and test the entire relays functionality
thoroughly when putting in operation. This paper has described and
analysed the reasons behind blackouts in Vendsyssel, Denmark and
shown that many factors, all related to the complexity of modern
numerical protection relays, caused these three consecutive
blackouts and a set of recommendations are provided in order to
help avoiding future blackouts. It should be noted that the authors
acknowledge that the correct use of modern numerical protection
relays leads to a better protection in general and thereby associated
higher reliability of the power system.
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